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POST-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: KANT AND ANALOGY RECONSIDERED 
Daniel Whistler 
 
There is no word, however, which is used more loosely, or in 
a greater variety of senses, than Analogy. (Mill 1974 444) 
 
 
This essay is a response to John Milbank’s comparison of Kant and Aquinas’ 
doctrines of analogy in ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’. Milbank’s essay forms 
the point of departure for my reconstruction of Kant’s actual theory of analogy. I 
conclude that Kant’s doctrine is more fundamental to his philosophical project and 
more innovative (with respect to philosophical traditions) than Milbank gives it credit 
for. In so arguing, I draw on Guérin’s neglected 1974 essay ‘Kant et l’ontologie 
analogique’ to designate Kantian analogy, ‘post-established harmony’. 
‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’ forms part of the Radical Orthodox 
project to resurrect Thomism as a viable option for thinking today. As this suggests, 
Kantian analogy is invoked in Milbank’s argument only as an inferior foil to Thomist 
analogy. The latter is the only legitimate form of analogy, because it is theorised 
therein as ontology. Everything else is either an inchoate precursor (Aristotle) or a 
later corruption (Kant). Aquinas was the only theorist of analogy to fully ground 
analogical predication in an analogical ontology – an analogia entis. The task of the 
present essay is to dispute this. There is an irreducible multiplicity to theories of 
analogy after Aquinas, hence Kant’s is to be understood on its own terms not those of 
Thomism. In order to justify this claim, I begin by tracing the history of the recent 
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attack on Kant’s theory of analogy. In the second half of the essay, I go on to unpack 
Kant’s theory itself with reference to the Prolegomena and the Critique of Judgment. 
 
 
1. Milbank’s Challenge 
 
1.1 The Prehistory of ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’ 
Milbank’s essay, ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’ emerges out of two prior 
interventions on the question of the relation of Aquinas and Kant’s theories of 
analogy. David Burrell’s 1973 Analogy and Philosophical Language argued that 
Aquinas’ use of analogy has been systematically misrepresented by generations of 
scholars as ‘a doctrine or canonised set of procedures’ (1973 11). Its reduction to a 
discursively-stable doctrine is, he claims, a mistake (1973 124). Whereas 
commentators usually define Thomist analogy by the formula, a:b::c:x (‘as a is to b, 
so c is to x’)1, in his mature writings Aquinas eschews this formula (1973 9-11). 
Burrell’s contention informs Milbank’s own analysis. However, Milbank 
decisively parts ways with Burrell on at least two points. First, Burrell’s remains an 
entirely semantic account: analogy is a mode of predication and nothing more. For 
Milbank, on the other hand, it is precisely the ontological grounding of Thomist 
analogy – the extent to which it is more than a merely semantic account – that means 
it eschews formulae. Milbank reads his metaphysically-strong interpretation of 
Aquinas onto Burrell’s distinction. Second, Burrell, pace Milbank, actually stresses 
the similarities between Aquinas and Kant, and so provides ‘an interpretation of 
Aquinas that is inspired by Kant’ (1973 134). Milbank explicitly criticises Burrell for 
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 This is Kant’s notation, as we shall see. 
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this (1997 13): it is a further symptom, he claims, of Burrell’s semantic reading. Seen 
from an ontological perspective, on the other hand, any apparent similarity between 
the two vanishes. 
The second intervention is Ernst Jüngel’s 1982 God as the Mystery of the 
World. Jüngel argues that both Aquinas and Kant’s theories of analogy stand in a 
classic metaphysical tradition of theorising God-talk (1983 263). However, this 
tradition is fatally flawed and its flaw revolves once more around the distinction 
between a form of analogy formulisable as a:b::c:x and analogia entis. According to 
Jüngel, every metaphysical theory of analogy – including those of Kant and Aquinas – 
implicitly or explicitly employs both forms: ‘The analogy of naming cannot be 
absolutely separated from the question of being… It implies, in some sense or other, 
an analogy of being.’ (1983 262) There is a ‘factual intermingling of the two 
analogies.’ (1983 276) The problem is, however, that these two forms of analogy 
generate a vicious circle: they each presuppose the other. In the wake of this failure of 
both Kantian and Thomist analogy as modes of God-talk, Jüngel turns to a Barthian 
analogia fidei. 
Milbank’s response, to which I turn in detail in what follows, is to question 
Jüngel’s conflation of Kant and Aquinas’ positions. There is not one illegitimate 
metaphysical tradition of analogy, but one illegitimate tradition of which Kant is a 
part on the one hand and one legitimate Thomist conception of analogy on the other. 
The former reduces analogy to the formula, a:b::c:x; the latter conceives analogy as 
analogia entis. 
 
1.2 Analogia Proportionalitatis and Analogia Attributionis 
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It is evident from the foregoing that central to recent debates about the value of 
Kantian analogy is the distinction between a form of analogy reducible to the formula, 
a:b::c:x, and analogic ontology. Traditionally, these two ways of theorising analogical 
relations are dubbed analogia proportionalitatis and analogia attributionis, 
respectively. Milbank’s argument is that every legitimate theory of analogy is 
analogia attributionis. Analogia proportionalitatis (which operates according to the 
formula, a:b::c:x) is a pale and perverse imitation, for it tries to predicate analogically 
without the requisite ontological grounding. 
While Aquinas’ mature work is the template for analogia attributionis, his 
early work also provides an influential statement of analogia proportionalitatis. An 
oft-quoted passage from De Veritate, for example, reads as follows, 
Knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely 
equivocally of God’s knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated 
analogously, or, in other words, according to a proportion… [Here, the 
analogy is] not between two things which have a proportion between them, 
but rather between two related proportions – for example, six has something 
in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times 
two… There is no reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously 
of God and creature in this [second] manner. (1952-4 vol. 1, q.2 a.11) 
Aquinas here articulates a version of analogia proportionalitatis by means of 
rejecting a simpler type of analogical predication (analogia proportionis). The latter is 
a two-term variety of analogy in the form of a simple ratio (‘two things which have a 
proportion between them’). No such simple ratio is possible between God and the 
world, Aquinas implies, since this would not do justice to God’s alterity. It is for this 
reason that Aquinas instead proposes a form of analogia proportionalitatis, a four-
term variety of analogy which sets up two analogously-related sets of ratios. This 
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ensures God’s relation to the world remains indirect. The analogy reads, ‘as six is to 
three, so four is to two’ – or, more formulaically, a:b::c:x. Thus, in terms of God’s 
knowledge and human knowledge, Aquinas here implies that ‘knowledge pertains to 
God in analogy to the way knowledge pertains to humans.’ The relation that holds 
between humans and their knowledge is the key to understanding the relation between 
God and His knowledge – even if we know nothing about God himself. This last 
clause is key to all variations of analogia proportionalitatis: it remains completely 
agnostic about the analogatum (‘x’). 
 According to Milbank, Aquinas soon changed his mind and rejected his early 
interpretation of analogy as analogia proportionalitatis. In its place, Aquinas deploys 
analogia attributionis. That is, the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa 
Theologiae provide a more faithful reference point for Aquinas’ thinking about 
analogy; here we clearly see the mature Aquinas think analogy as analogia 
attributionis. In the Summa Theologiae, for example, Aquinas writes, 
Whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a 
creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things 
pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean 
between pure equivocation and simple univocation. (1981 part 1, q.13 a.5) 
Central here is Aquinas’ appeal to God as principle and cause. Jüngel, for example, 
defines analogia attributionis as follows: ‘If, in the analogy of proportionality, A 
relates to B as C to D, then in the analogy of attribution, B, C, and D all relate in 
varying ways to A, on the basis of which they are commonly named.’ (1983 270) That 
is, while analogia proportionalitatis is founded on a mathematical inference from one 
ratio to another (a:b::c:x), analogia attributionis is grounded in the ontological 
relation that holds between causes. Analogia attributionis directly reflects how the 
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world works – the very metaphysical order of things (hence, the alternative name, 
analogia ordonis). 
The question therefore follows: why is causation – and so the metaphysical 
order of things – analogical for Aquinas? The answer lies, on the one hand, in his 
rejection of any ens commune holding between God and world in order to emphasise 
God’s utter transcendence over worldly things. The creator/created relation cannot be 
univocal. On the other hand, however, God is the cause of the world, and for Aquinas 
the neoplatonic maxim still holds true: ‘an effect is like its cause, indeed pre-
eminently exists in its cause’ (Milbank and Pickstock 2001 31). Thus, equivocal 
predication is just as impossible. Hence, Aquinas emphasises an analogical relation 
between God and world. 
Aquinas’ model for the God/world relation is at bottom neo-Platonic, a 
‘metaphysics of participated being’ (Milbank and Pickstock 2001 46). Analogical 
attribution is possible because every effect of God is like Him insofar as it is caused 
by Him, but unlike Him insofar as God exceeds it. God is the excessive paradigm of 
all qualities. For example, finite objects can only be ascribed goodness to the extent 
that they participate in God’s goodness and so ‘borrow’ the property from Him to 
some small degree. There is no ‘measurable visible ratio’ (Milbank and Pickstock 
2001 8), yet still a ‘harmonious’ (2001 8) community of being – ‘a hidden bond 
between finitely remote categories and things.’ (2001 47)2 
 
There are therefore three possible types of analogy: analogia proportionis, 
analogia proportionalitatis and analogia attributionis – and the relation Aquinas 
establishes between them is reminiscent (at least on Milbank’s reading) of Hegelian 
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 This metaphysical account has epistemological consequences. Mind and world are distinct, yet 
harmoniously ordered, owing to their respective participation in the divine (2001 15-8). 
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dialectic. In his early work, Aquinas negates analogia proportionis in favour of 
analogia proportionalitatis; however, he later finds this one-sided negation 
unsatisfactory, so he negates analogia proportionalitatis in turn in favour of analogia 
attributionis. Yet, analogia attributionis is in many ways analogia proportionis 
theologically understood (or ontologically enriched). This negation of the negation is 
a return to a two-term ratio, this time envisaged as holding between cause and effect. 
 
1.3 Kant Read through Aquinas 
By means of… analogy, I can obtain a relational concept of things which are 
absolutely unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of 
children (=a) is to the love of parents (=b), so the welfare of the human 
species (=c) is to that unknown God (=x), which we call love; not as if it had 
the least similarity to any human inclinations, but because we can posit its 
relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one 
another. (Kant 2001 4:358)
3
 
Such is Kant’s classic statement of analogical predication in a footnote to the 
Prolegomena. Traditionally, such a statement has been identified with Thomist 
analogy. Gill, for example, expresses this doxa when he writes that the above ‘could 
be mistaken as coming directly from Aquinas’ “own pen”’ (1984 22). Lash has made 
similar claims (1982 81).
4
 This traditional contention rests on a reading of Thomist 
analogy through the lens of De Veritate – and therefore presents both Kant and 
Aquinas as proponents of analogia proportionalitatis. In this passage from the 
Prolegomena, Kant (just like Aquinas in De Veritate) conceives the operation of 
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 All citations to Kant’s works are to English translations. However, volume and page references are to 
the German Akademie edition, except in the case of the Critique of Pure Reason where they are to the 
A and B editions. 
4
 Jüngel also notes that on reading the Prolegomena ‘one is involuntarily reminded of the 
corresponding expositions of Thomas Aquinas.’ (1983 266) One justification for this position is that 
both Kant and Aquinas here rely on the same, common source – Aristotle’s Topics 108a. 
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analogy through two ratios. The analogy reads in Kant’s own symbolism, ‘as a is to b, 
so c is to x’, and so his example reads, ‘as parent’s love relates to their children’s 
welfare, so God’s love relates to the welfare of humanity’. Again, the analogy holds 
between two relations, not between any entity in those relations. As Kant puts it 
elsewhere in the Prolegomena, not ‘an imperfect similarity of two things, but a 
perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.’ (2001 4:358) It is 
precisely this four-term type of analogy – analogia proportionalitatis – which Kant 
and Aquinas seem to share. 
Milbank’s essay (following in the wake of Burrell) puts paid to this simplistic 
identification. Milbank agrees with Gill to the extent that Kant’s conception of 
analogy is a form of analogia proportionalitatis. However, he counters by drawing 
attention to Aquinas’ recourse to analogia attributionis in his later works. A 
conclusion like Gill’s ‘conflicts with at least the appearance of Aquinas’ mature texts, 
which talk preponderantly about attribution’ (1997 9). In consequence, to compare 
Kant to the Aquinas of De Veritate is misleading, because the latter work does not 
reveal the grounds of Aquinas’ thinking about analogy. That is, Milbank contends that 
Kant’s theory of analogy utterly lacks the ontological aspect so crucial to Aquinas’ 
theory. While Aquinas makes recourse to an ontological ground, Kant does not. 
Kant’s employment of analogy is utterly divorced from any analogia entis (1997 15). 
For Kant, analogy is ‘primarily a linguistic doctrine’ (1997 15).5 
Kant’s ontology is, Milbank argues, in no way analogical. Instead, it is 
structured by a ‘metaphysics of the sublime’ (1997 11) – that is, a metaphysics which 
insists on univocal relations between all phenomena and an equivocal relationship 
between phenomena and noumena. Everything within the sensible domain of 
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 Of course, this is also a polemic against those, like Burrell, who interpret analogy semantically in the 
twentieth century. 
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experience is univocally related; however, once one attempts to move beyond the 
limits of possible experience, once one attempts to cross from the sensible to the 
supersensible, then one encounters an abyss:  
Kant’s entire philosophy is in a sense an aesthetic of the sublime in which 
one is brought up against the margin of organised… experience, and at this 
margin becomes overwhelmed by the intimation of the materially formless 
and infinitely total. (1997 10) 
While everything in the phenomenal realm is fully knowable, we can obtain only ‘a 
minimality of content… concerning the noumena’ (1997 10), precisely because the 
noumena is equivocally – and not analogously – related to our own possible 
experience. Milbank interprets Kantian dualism in terms of equivocity. In 
consequence, the supersensible is emptied of all content – that is (in more Kantian 
terms), the same categories cannot be legitimately applied to the two domains. Kant 
here inaugurates ‘a new thinking of the transcendent as the absolutely unknowable 
void… [in which] all that persists of transcendence is sheer unknowability or its 
quality of non-representability and non-depictablility.’ (2004 211-3) There is 
therefore no analogic ontology in Kant’s philosophy, and so no trace of analogia 
attributionis. 
It is here that Milbank claims to justify the superiority of analogia 
attributionis to analogia proportionalitatis. Grounding analogy in ontology is the only 
possible way of maintaining a theory of analogy, because otherwise analogy 
undermines itself. And this is exactly what happens in Kant’s philosophy. Kantian 
agnosticism is rigid and ultimately dogmatic – insofar as God is known, He is known 
univocally; insofar as God is not known, He is not known equivocally. Hence, insofar 
as ‘c:x’ is known from ‘a:b’, it is known univocally. Milbank writes, 
 10 
While, from one point of view, proper proportionality is ‘more agnostic’ than 
attribution, from another point of view it is less so, because the common ratio 
can be universally specified. In Kant’s usage, analogy of proper 
proportionality tends to posit a specifiable, fixed, precisely known sort of 
relation of God to the creation. (1997 9) 
In other words, Kantian analogy deconstructs itself: no proper analogous relation is 
possible, owing to his commitment to a metaphysics of the sublime. This is Milbank’s 
proof that there can be no legitimate analogy without analogic ontology. 
 
Kantian ontology is, according to Milbank, a non-analogic ontology, and, as 
such, Kant’s use of analogical reasoning is not in any way grounded in an underlying 
ontological structure. It is therefore deficient – especially when judged by the norm of 
Thomist analogy. However, a qualification is necessary. Milbank’s invocation of 
ontology with respect to Kantian philosophy is extremely controversial – and meant to 
be so. The category of being is notoriously absent from Kant’s redescription of 
experience (Heidegger 1998; Lord 2003). Milbank’s polemical use of the term 
‘ontology’ is oblivious to this, for the basic reason that only by talking of Kantian 
ontology can Kant be read through Thomist lenses. Aquinas talks of being, so Kant 
must be made to as well. In order to achieve this end, Milbank interprets the place of 
ontology in Kant’s philosophy as twofold: first (and this is the element on which most 
of Milbank’s emphasis falls) it comprises the relation of the sensible to the 
supersensible; second, it comprises the relation between phenomena in the sensible 
realm. These two elements constitute what Milbank means by ‘Kant’s ontology’ – and 
below I follow him for the sake of argument. Therefore, the question of whether Kant 
subscribes or not to an analogic ontology is the same question as whether the sensible 
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and the supersensible are analogically related or whether phenomena are analogically 
related to each other.
6
 
 
 
2. Analogy Beyond Aquinas 
 
Before, however, turning to Kant’s theory of analogy itself, I want to flag up the 
limitations of reading modern theories of analogy through Thomist lenses. Analogy 
has been a concept with which to experiment and to innovate and Kantian analogy 
marks one more creation of a new category irreducible to tradition. 
  
2.1 Analogy in Early Modern Science 
Each theory of analogy is singular. This is true not only of philosophical, but also 
scientific deployments of the concept. Mary Hesse has been one of the most strident 
voices in distinguishing between Scholastic, metaphysical uses of analogy and its use 
in scientific discourse. The two cannot be conflated – and no genealogy, she claims, 
can appropriate the latter as a mere derivative reformulation of the former. (Hesse 
1966 57, 130) It is a well-rehearsed point that early modern science does away with 
analogical ontology. However, what is noted far less is that analogy is redeployed 
during this period in a manner that bears no resemblance to – and little obvious 
dependence on – Scholastic theories of analogy. For example, Cajetan’s attempt to 
formalise Thomist analogy (Burrell 1973 100-121, 176-96) is not the beginnings of 
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 There are, I am implying, many other (more sophisticated) ways of reconstructing a Kantian ontology 
(the references to Heidegger and Lord above provide two such examples). Indeed, as an anonymous 
reviewer of this paper suggested, the relation between analogy and ontology in Aristotle may well 
prove a key starting point for any such reconstruction. Callanan (2008 761) insists on the need for 
future investigation into the Greek origins of Kant’s doctrine of analogy generally. 
 12 
modernity, but the end of premodernity. With early modern science (Boyle, Newton), 
something new begins when it comes to analogy (Hesse 1966 130-50). 
In early modern science, analogy is synonymous with induction, a method of 
moving from the particular to the general. An early scientific example is to be found 
in Boyle’s work,  
Apposite comparisons do not only give Light, but strength to the passages 
they belong to, since they are not always bare Pictures and Resemblances, but 
a kind of Argument, being oftentimes, if I may so call them, Analogous 
Instances, which do declare the Nature, or Way of operating, of the thing they 
relate to, and by that means do in a sort prove, that as 'tis possible, so it is not 
improbable, that they may be such as 'tis represented. (1690, ‘Preface’) 
Through comparing various phenomena, one is able to infer a law of nature. Analogy 
is a means of working out how phenomena work (on, as we shall see, the 
presupposition of a univocal ontology). This usage of analogy was also popular in 
theological contexts: Butler, for example, labels his teleological argument a form of 
analogy (1961 2). Again, analogy is a means of reasoning from what is observed to 
what is unobserved on the presupposition that the same laws are always obeyed. As 
late as the early nineteenth century, Mill could claim, ‘The word “analogy”, as the 
name of a mode of reasoning, is generally taken for some kind of argument supposed 
to be of an inductive nature.’ (1974) 
It is Newton, however, who most exemplifies this tradition. His third ‘rule of 
reasoning in philosophy’ states, ‘The qualities of bodies… which are to be found to 
belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the 
universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.’ (1953 3) From the constant recurrence of 
properties during an experiment, the constant recurrence of properties in the rest of 
the universe is inferred. Such reasoning is only possible on the assumption that nature 
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is homogenous, that all realms of being subscribe to the same laws – that is, that 
Nature is univocal. This assumption is dubbed the ‘analogy of Nature’: nature is 
‘simple and always consonant with itself’ (1953 4). ‘This is the foundation of all 
philosophy’, Newton continues (1953 4). Without the ‘analogy of Nature’, induction 
could not occur – premised as it is on synchronic and diachronic homogeneity 
throughout the universe.
7
 
 This scientific deployment of analogy bears little resemblance to Thomist use 
of the concept. As Hesse points out, it is not ‘a third way between univocity and 
equivocity’ (1966 141) – this fundamental feature of all Scholastic employments of 
analogy is lacking. To read Newton’s analogy of Nature in the terms of either De 
Veritate or the Summa Theologiae would be a fundamental mistake. 
 
2.2 Leibniz 
Analogy plays a central, if very different role in Leibniz’ philosophy. Here, analogy 
becomes ontological once more, yet still without being derivative of earlier Thomist 
understanding. 
The concept of analogy emerges in Leibniz’ early essay, What is an Idea?. 
Taking issue with Spinoza’s conception of idea as act, Leibniz conceives of an idea as 
an ‘ability [or faculty] to think about a thing’ (1969 207). In so doing he reintroduces 
a referential relation between idea and thing so thoroughly avoided in Spinozan 
epistemology. The notion of analogy is introduced to explain this correspondence. He 
writes, “There are relations [in an idea] which correspond to the relations of the thing 
expressed.’ (1969 207) Leibniz makes his appeal to analogy explicit at the end of the 
same paragraph: ‘Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be 
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similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the 
relations.’ (1969 207) In other words, Leibniz attempts to refute Spinozan monism in 
which the idea and its referent are substantially identical through deploying the 
resources of analogy. Analogy is a way of preserving some sort of ontological 
connection between mind and world without reducing them to the same substance. 
Analogy – as always – mediates between sameness and difference. 
The model sketched in What is an Idea? is an early version of the fundamental 
Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony. Everything – including mind and 
world – are indirectly but harmoniously related. During Leibniz’ career, pre-
established harmony goes on to determine the relation between soul and body, monad 
and monad as well as nature and freedom. For example, thirty six years after What is 
an Idea?, Principles of Nature and Grace, based on Reason lays bare the analogical 
foundations of pre-established harmony once more. In the very title of Principles of 
Nature and Grace, based on Reason, we have a theological foreshadowing of Kant’s 
problematic in the Introduction to the third Critique: how can the laws of physics and 
the dictates of morality (or, in Leibniz’ terms, ‘God as architect’ and ‘God as 
monarch’) be reconciled? Just like Kant, Leibniz wants to retain some modicum of 
separation between the principles of salvation and those of the natural world (for 
salvation must not occur ‘by a dislocation of nature’), whilst at the same time 
ensuring that there is communication between the two ‘realms’ (1969 640). And this 
is precisely what pre-established harmony achieves: the indirect interconnection of 
nature and grace occurs ‘by virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time 
between the realms of nature and of grace, between God as architect and God as 
monarch.’ (1969 640; Deleuze 1990 329) 
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 Pre-established harmony is therefore another name for analogic ontology; it is 
a new, innovative formation of analogia entis. That is, Leibniz’ conception of 
analogia entis in particular is very different from its Thomist predecessor; for 
example, Leibniz uses analogy to maintain a distinction between the two series of 
nature and grace, whereas Aquinas does so precisely to overcome this distinction. We 
must conclude therefore that there is not merely one stable form of the analogia entis 
as Milbank would like to believe, but a plurality of irreducible experiments in 
analogic ontology. 
 
 
3. Analogy in the Prolegomena 
 
The Prolegomena is the standard text on which critiques of Kantian analogy have 
focused. I will argue, however, that the Prolegomena only provides a preliminary 
orientation to Kantian analogy. 
 Kant raises analogy at a crucial moment in the text, during the Conclusion, 
‘On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason’. Despite this title, Kant is not 
primarily concerned with undermining the pretensions of those who go beyond the 
limits of possible experience, but on demonstrating the possibility of a new 
metaphysics set on firm foundations (2001 4:360). And it is analogy which makes it 
possible. In a post-critical philosophy, metaphysics will often be speaking of what is 
unknown – and Kant names ‘analogy’ that mode of thinking by which legitimate 
inferences are made about the unknown. For analogy provides no constitutive 
knowledge of an unknown object, but merely allows us to ‘obtain a relational concept 
of things’ (2001 4:358) – that is, to infer what external relationships this unknown 
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object must possess in terms of other similar relationships. Analogical reasoning is 
indirect: it makes claims about one relation only through prior acquaintance with 
another relation.
8
 
In analogy, the object ‘remains unknown to me in its intrinsic character’ 
(2002b 20:280), only its relations become visible: ‘Though what is unknown should 
not become the least more known – which we cannot even hope – yet the notion of 
this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct.’ (2001 4:354) 
The fourth term remains intrinsically unknown, just as in De Veritate. Kant 
emphasises this in the first Critique, when distinguishing between mathematical and 
philosophical analogy: ‘From three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge 
only of the relation to a fourth, not the fourth relation itself.’ (1929 A179-80/B222) 
Nothing about the nature of the analogatum can even be thought. Analogy takes the 
subject beyond normal representation into a mysterious beyond which exceeds both 
sense and thought. To this extent, Milbank is of course correct in his diagnosis of a 
metaphysics of the sublime. 
Therefore, only analogy can satisfy both the limitations on knowledge 
imposed by the first Critique as well as the human need to think about what lies 
beyond such limits. Analogy is the (tentative) mode in which reason legitimately 
transcends experience. For example, God-talk is only made possible by ‘tak[ing] 
away the objective anthropomorphism from our concept of the Supreme Being’ (2001 
4:358) – that is, by reinterpreting, rather than replacing, propositions about the divine. 
Future metaphysics is ‘symbolic’, instead of ‘dogmatic’ (2001 4:357). It is a 
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 On the relation of Kant’s theory of analogy to induction and to the early modern account of analogy 
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Kant’s employment of ‘analogy’ from the pre-critical lectures to the Critique of Pure Reason, it is 
Kant’s distinction between a mathematical use of analogy (premised on a univocal ontology) and a 
philosophical use (analogia proportionalitatis) which differentiates him from this this early modern 
tradition (753). 
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hermeneutic enterprise of reinterpreting the traditional statements of metaphysics in a 
way that retains the mystery of the unknown object ‘x’.9 Whereas the dogmatists 
supposed that their metaphysical statements provided them with determinate 
knowledge about transcendent objects, post-critical metaphysicians will, on the 
contrary, be fully aware that their statements can only be understood analogically. The 
difference resides in the type of judgment: past metaphysics has been done in a 
determinative key, while future metaphysics will be reflective. The same propositions 
are asserted in a different mode (reflected, not determined). 
 Crucial is the convergence of three key terms – analogy, symbol and reflective 
judgment. The destiny of the concept of analogy in the Kantian oeuvre is 
fundamentally tied to the uses to which symbol and reflective judgment are put. And 
yet Kant’s conception of analogy here seems to play into Milbank’s hands. Analogy is 
envisioned as an epistemological tool that predicates properties of God ‘as if’ they 
‘really’ applied. In other words, properties are predicated whether or not they do 
determinately apply to God. There is a stress on the subjective act of judging in 
Kant’s account that seems indifferent to the way the world actually is, that seems to 
forego any appeal to analogic ontology. What exists beyond the sensible is 
unknowable – and to that extent Milbank’s notion of a metaphysics of the sublime is 
confirmed. Yet, in what follows, I contend that Kant’s presentation of analogy in the 
Prolegomena does not get to the heart of his thinking on the subject. The Critique of 
Judgment provides a much richer picture, one in which analogy is ontologically 
grounded (always remembering that I am using ‘ontology’ in Milbank’s sense as the 
relation between the sensible and the supersensible). The rest of this essay is devoted 
to uncovering this implicit account of analogic ontology in the Critique of Judgment. 
                                                 
9
 Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone is a book-long exercise in this analogic metaphysics 
(1998 6:65). 
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4. Analogy and the Symbol 
 
Kant’s concern with analogy comes explicitly to the fore in §59 of the Critique of 
Judgment. In this section (‘Beauty as a Symbol of Morality’), Kant defines the 
symbol as ‘a Darstellung in accordance with mere analogy’ or as an ‘indirect 
Darstellung according to analogy’ (1987a 5:352). Kant repeats such a view fourteen 
years later in On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff: ‘The symbol of 
an idea is a Darstellung of the object by analogy’ (2002b 20:279). In fact, at times, 
analogy and symbol are employed interchangeably (1987a 5:354). It therefore seems 
fair to interpret Kant’s symbol as analogical, and it is this intimate link between 
symbols and analogy that I consider further in this section. 
 
4.1 The Definition of the Symbol 
The definition of symbol is reached through a series of distinctions between different 
forms of Darstellungen (exhibitions, presentations). The first set of distinctions is 
between ‘example’, ‘schema’ and something else which is impossible. These terms 
name the different possibilities for Darstellungen that ‘establish’ the objective reality 
of their concept. Examples are intuitions which show the ‘reality’ of empirical 
concepts, while schemata are the corresponding intuitions which exhibit the twelve 
categories in the sensible realm; however, Kant continues, 
If anyone goes as far as to demand that we establish the objective reality of 
the rational concepts (i.e. the Ideas) for the sake of their theoretical cognition, 
then he asks for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition can be 
given that would be adequate to them. (1987a 5:351) 
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No corresponding intuitions are possible for Ideas of reason, since by definition such 
Ideas lie beyond all possible experience (1929 A327/B384). They are precisely what 
cannot be directly intuited. 
The problem that faces Kant, then, is that if the reality of ideas cannot be 
‘established’ by intuition, it is not clear what other way of exhibiting them intuitively 
there can be. The answer he gives to this problem is – by means of symbolism. That 
is, Kant switches perspectives. While he began by listing ways in which concepts can 
be ‘established’ in intuitions, he now considers alternatives to establishing. The 
schematic mode is that of establishing; the alternative is the symbolic mode of 
exhibition: ‘All hypotyposis (Darstellung) consists in making sensible, and is either 
schematic or symbolic’ (1987a 5:351). The schematic mode produces intuitions that 
determinately exhibit a concept: it ‘establishes’ concepts in intuitions (and hence 
examples and schemata are instances of such schematic intuitions). Kant’s point is 
that Ideas cannot be exhibited schematically, but he goes on to contend that Ideas can 
in fact be exhibited symbolically. 
So, in these first few lines of §59, there are two types of distinction at play: the 
first set of distinctions names the different possible instantiations of schematism 
(depending on whether it is an empirical concept, a category or Idea being 
schematised); the second set of distinctions goes on to question whether schematism 
is the only possible mode of Darstellung, and answers negatively: symbolism is 
another option.  
 
4.2 The Nature of the Analogy in Symbolic Exhibition  
Here is how Kant defines this symbolic mode of Darstellung: 
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In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to 
which no symbolic intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied 
with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the 
procedure it follows in schematising. (1987a 5:351) 
It is analogy which makes possible symbolic Darstellung of Ideas. Instead of a direct, 
‘demonstrative’ relation holding between intuition and Idea, symbolism is indirect, 
employing analogy. 
To understand the appeal to analogy, one first needs to consider how direct, 
non-analogic Darstellung – schematism – functions. Chapter One of the Analytic of 
Principles in the Critique of Pure Reason begins, ‘In all subsumptions of an object 
under a concept the representation of the object must be homogenous with the 
concept’ (1929 A137/B176). It is precisely this circumstance that gives rise to 
examples, for here the properties of empirical concepts are continuously exemplified 
in the intuitions subsumed under them. In examples, concept and intuition are 
commensurate. However, the opening of the second paragraph seems to put paid to 
this general rule when it comes to the special case of categories: ‘But pure concepts of 
the understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed 
from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition.’ (1929 
A137/B176) Categories are on first glance heterogeneous to intuition, raising the 
problem of how intuitions can exhibit them. Yet, Kant is quick to qualify such a 
statement, for, while in terms of content it is true that categories and intuitions are 
heterogeneous, in terms of form they are still commensurate, because both are 
intimately related to time. Hence, Kant writes, ‘A transcendental determination of 
time is… homogenous with the category’ (1929 A138/B177). Thus, to the extent that 
time is a form of all intuition, intuitions turn out to be commensurate with categories. 
‘Thus,’ Kant concludes, ‘an application of the category to appearances becomes 
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possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema 
of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances 
under the category.’ (1929 A139/B178)10 
The schema’s role therefore is to make explicit the temporal conditions 
pertaining to the use of categories – conditions which are already implicit in their 
objective constitution. Schemata are that ‘third thing, which is on the one hand 
homogenous with category, and on the other hand with appearance, and which thus 
makes the application of the former to the latter possible.’ (1929 A138/B177) They 
are products of the imagination and so mediate between categories and intuitions, just 
as the imagination mediates between understanding and sensibility. They do so by 
flagging up the pre-existing common ground between the two. 
For our purposes here, what needs to be emphasised is, pace Kant’s initial 
claim, the ultimate commensurability of categories and intuitions, which schemata 
reveal. The very fact that ‘this mediating representation’ can ‘in one respect be 
intellectual… [and] in another be sensible’ (1929 A138/B177) tells in favour of the 
univocal relation that holds between categories and intuitions. This univocal relation 
is grounded in the fact that time pertains to both elements in the very same manner. 
Schemata merely make such univocity explicit. 
 
Returning to the symbol, one can see straight away that this common element 
is precisely what is lacking between the Idea and its intuition. Ideas are thought 
outside of temporal conditions. Between Ideas and intuitions this formal element is 
not shared. No schema can be generated which mediates between the two. The 
question therefore becomes more insistent: how do symbols mediate between Ideas 
                                                 
10
 Thus Kant is able to accomplish a difficult balancing act: to bring the conceptual and the intuitive 
into communication, while at the same time maintaining their distinctiveness (a key tenet of the critical 
project as such). 
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and intuitions? Kant answers this question by appeal to analogy: the Idea ‘is supplied 
with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it 
follows in schematising’ (1987a 5:351; my emphasis). In a later paragraph of the third 
Critique, Kant develops these comments further: 
Symbol exhibition uses analogy… in which judgment performs a double 
function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it 
applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely 
different object, of which the former object is only the symbol. (1987a 5:352; 
see also 2002b 20:279-80) 
In terms of the mathematical proportions of the Prolegomena, ‘symbol:effect::Idea:its 
effect’. What is exhibited by the symbol is not a representative of the Idea itself but a 
representative of the relations this Idea has (2002b 20:280). The analogy involved in 
symbolic reasoning can be characterised thus: the subject reflectively compares the 
way a sensible representation works with the way an Idea is thought to function 
(Flach 1982 457, Deleuze 1984 54). Symbolism is thus a form of reflective judgment; 
indeed, as we shall see, it is the exemplary instance of this kind of judgment. 
 
4.3 Schema, Symbol and Sign 
As well as emphasising the analogous nature of symbolic representations, §59 of the 
Critique of Judgment insists forcefully on their non-discursive nature. The distinction 
between the schematic and the symbolic is a distinction between types of operations 
that make thought intuitive: 
The intuitive can be divided into schematic and symbolic presentation: both 
are hypotyposes, i.e. exhibitions, not mere characterisations, i.e. designations 
of concepts by accompanying sensible signs. (1987a 5:351-2) 
 23 
Both symbols and schemata are means of making intuitive and so ‘must be contrasted 
with the discursive’ (1987a 5:351). On the side of discourse stand ‘characterisations’ 
or ‘signs’. Although they are intuited, signs in fact speak solely to the understanding: 
they are externalised shorthand for conceptual relations. Here is how Kant defines the 
sign: 
Such signs contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the 
object; their point is the subjective one of serving as a means for reproducing 
concepts… They are either words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) 
signs, and they merely express concepts. (1987a 5:352) 
Signs are merely subjective, arbitrary aids for communicating concepts. As such, their 
relation to their concept is merely extrinsic. They do not exhibit it in any way. 
Symbols, on the other hand, are exhibitions (Darstellung) – not ‘designations’ – and 
to this extent still have an intrinsic connection to their Idea. 
Symbols are therefore the middle term of a three-term series: on the one hand, 
they are not designations; however, on the other hand, this relation is in no way direct. 
Symbols – and by extension analogy – fall somewhere between signs and schemata. 
This three-term series, moreover, is remarkably similar to the 
univocity/analogy/equivocity series of premodern theories of analogy. Schemata are 
employed when there is a hidden univocal relation between category and intuition: 
time can be predicated in the very same manner of both. On the other hand, signs are 
grounded on an utterly equivocal (and thus philosophically banal) relation between 
intuition and conceptual thought. As Kant categorically states, ‘Such signs contain 
nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object.’ (1987a 5:352) Between 
these two extremes, the symbol is to be found. There is no common ground between a 
symbolic intuition and the Idea it evokes, for Ideas (unlike categories) exist 
independently of time. However, in an indirect and mediated way, the intuition still 
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manages to exhibit the Idea – that is, although there is nothing in common between 
them, through a ‘leap of the imagination’11 they are brought into communication. The 
symbol is positioned at the mean between univocity (schemata) and equivocity 
(signs). 
The same story can be told from the point of view of transcendental 
psychology. Sensibility and the understanding are univocally related, precisely 
because imagination is the ‘common root’ between them (1929 A15/B29). It is the 
mediating role of imagination that means that time can be predicated by each of them 
in exactly the same manner. Out of this process schemata emerge. On the other hand, 
reason is related to sensibility in two possible ways, depending on the type of 
judgment in operation. From the perspective of determinative judgment, reason is 
equivocally related to sensibility; however, from the perspective of reflective 
judgment (i.e. symbolism), reason is indirectly and analogously related to it. 
 
4.4 Reality as Reflected 
The appeal made above to two different perspectives (determination and reflection) is 
absolutely crucial to my argument. At the beginning of §59, Kant considers the 
possibility of exhibiting Ideas from two perspectives. First, he considers this 
possibility in terms of intuition directly ‘establishing’ such Ideas. This, he concludes, 
is impossible. In other words, from the perspective of determinative judgment, 
intuition is heterogeneous to Idea. However, this is not true when it comes to 
reflective judgment: the subject can reflectively judge intuitions as symbolising Ideas 
– and, as we have seen at length, analogy is the means by which this is achieved. In 
consequence, when the perspective is switched from determination to reflection, the 
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 Such, I suggest, is a useful way to conceive of reflective judgment. 
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symbol is then made possible. By means of analogy, the intuition is reflectively 
judged to correspond to an Idea to which determinatively no intuition corresponds. 
 However, one must not conclude from this that symbolic correspondence is 
somehow artificial or fictional. There is little sense in claiming that determinate 
judgment reveals reality ‘more’ or ‘better’ than reflective judgment. All domains of 
Kantian reality (or ontology) are idealist: they are all (partially) creations of the 
interaction of the faculties. In fact, as we shall soon see, Kant claims that reflective 
judgment is the better, more revealing mode in which to understand some domains of 
reality or ontology. I am here arguing against the common assumption that just 
because reflective judgment is subjective, it therefore makes no claims about how the 
world is. The consequence of this assumption is that determinative judgment is given 
priority. However, its flaw is that it does not account for many of the roles Kant 
ascribes to reflective judgment. For example, reflective judgment makes 
determinative judgment possible by first forming the concepts which determinative 
judgment employs. If reflection were divorced from reality in some way (although 
what this would mean on transcendental idealist terms is difficult to tell), then so too 
would determinative judgment. 
Once the above is realised, the following I contend is the consequence: there 
are two modes of Kantian ontology – reality as determined and reality as reflected. 
Schematism (the process of determination) and symbolism (the process of reflection) 
are therefore two differing but equally significant ways in which reality is 
constructed. Moreover, as we have seen, symbolism operates by means of analogy. In 
other words, reality as reflected is analogous. This is the reason Kantian ontology is 
analogic ontology. In the next section, I spell this out in greater detail with reference 
to the ‘ontological’ relation between the sensible and the supersensible. 
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5. The Analogy between Nature and Freedom 
 
5.1 The Two Domains 
The Introduction to the Critique of Judgment is Kant’s fullest ontological statement, 
as well as both the ‘conclusion’ and ‘key’ to the critical project (Nuzzo 2005 88). It 
begins by outlining the results of the first two Critiques, ‘Our cognitive power as a 
whole has two domains, that of the concepts of nature and that of the concept of 
freedom’ (1987a 5:174), and, corresponding to these domains, ‘understanding and 
reason have two different legislations’. Even though Kant is fond of speaking of a 
‘gulf’ separating the two domains (the sensible and the supersensible) (1987a 5:175, 
5:195), it is (as he himself concedes) somewhat of an exaggeration. The third 
Antinomy demonstrated that the two realms are necessarily ‘compatible’ (1929 A538-
58/B566-86) and the Critique of Practical Reason argued that the necessity of the 
highest good and the postulate of God ensure that duty can, and so must, be actualised 
in the sensible realm of phenomena. Hence, Kant writes in the Introduction to the 
Critique of Judgment, 
Even though the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, 
yet the reverse is possible (…with regard to the consequences that the 
concept of freedom has in nature); and this possibility is contained in the very 
concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect is to be brought about in 
the world. (1987a 5:195) 
The gulf Kant draws attention to is then only a partial gulf, or (more exactly) a ‘one-
way gulf’. While, according to the first Critique, access is denied theoretical cognition 
hoping to progress from the sensible to the supersensible, the conclusion of the second 
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Critique results in an asymmetry, for the same is not true of practical cognition, which 
can progress from the supersensible back into the sensible realm. 
In fact, this leads Kant to insist that the domains must be unifiable after all. 
The problem is merely that the first Critique was unable to discover this unity from 
the side of theoretical reason; there was something in its manner of approaching the 
problem that meant it missed the theoretical unity of freedom and nature – and it is the 
task of the third Critique to supplement its predecessor in this regard. ‘So,’ Kant 
concludes, ‘there must after all be a basis uniting… [what] underlies nature and the 
supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically’ (1987a 5:176). The 
Critique of Judgment must discover this unity theoretically. 
In other words, the first two Critiques underdetermined the relation between 
the sensible and the supersensible, and this relation will only be fully articulated in the 
third Critique. Kantian ontology (in Milbank’s sense) is therefore only fully and 
adequately articulated in this work. 
 
5.2 Reflection 
Kant discovers the basis of such theoretical unity in reflective judgment; it succeeds 
where the determinative judgment of the first Critique failed. This is crucial for my 
purposes. Kant implies that determinative judgment captures the relation between the 
sensible and the supersensible less than reflective judgment. It is properly approached 
through reflective judgment (which is synonymous with analogy). 
Determinative judgment is defined as the subsuming of intuitions under 
concepts (the particular under the universal) (1987a 5:179). This is the relation of 
intuition and concept that gives rise to schematism. In determinative judgment, the 
concept ‘is given’, hence judgment is ‘only subsumptive’; there is no creativity to its 
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action, merely a mechanical synthesis between the materials which the understanding 
and sensibility have already supplied. Reflective judgment, on the contrary, is 
creative. Kant writes, ‘If only the particular is given and judgment has to find the 
universal for it, then this power is… reflective.’ (1987a 5:179) Reflection proceeds 
hermeneutically, because it ‘is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the 
universal’ (1987a 5:180). In so doing, new concepts are invented: 
[Reflection is] the state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover 
the subjective conditions under which we are able to arrive at concepts. It is 
the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different 
sources of knowledge. (1929 A260/B316; my emphasis) 
How does this ascension from particular to universal occur? Reflective 
judgment requires a rule to guide its action in deciding how a given intuition is to be 
conceived in terms of concepts which, in turn, have not been given (1987a 5:180). 
The rule by which reflection discovers new concepts is purposiveness: 
Judgment’s principle concerning the form that things of nature have in terms 
of empirical laws in general is the purposiveness of nature in its diversity. In 
other words through this concept we present nature as if an understanding 
contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws. 
(1987a 5:180-1) 
The potential to be systematised or purposiveness constitutes the a priori principle 
belonging uniquely to reflection. Purposiveness is, Kant emphasises, a regulative 
principle – to acquire new concepts it must be postulated irrespective of whether it 
can be proven determinatively: ‘We had to assume that there is such unity even 
though we have no insight into this unity and cannot prove it.’ (1987a 5:184) 
Nonetheless, some form of systematicity must inhere in the intuitions we reflect upon 
for us to produce concepts (1987a 5:183-4). Aesthetic judgment is Kant’s primary 
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example of a form of reflective judgment. It takes account of ‘the harmony of the 
form of the object (the form that is in the apprehension of the object prior to any 
concept) with the cognitive powers’ (1987a 5:192). What is most beautiful is the 
intuition which accords most with purposiveness. 
 
Stepping back, it is possible to discern how reflective judgment, guided by 
purposiveness, is able to fulfil the task Kant sets it and unify the two ‘ontological’ 
domains of nature and freedom. Purposiveness provides a theoretical criterion by 
which to judge the world’s accordance with the mind; therefore beautiful objects 
provide a means by which one can theoretically reconcile the sensible realm with the 
mind’s demand for freedom. In short, beautiful objects provide evidence for the 
sensible realm’s positive relation to the supersensible. Kant writes,  
The concept of a purposiveness of nature… makes possible the transition 
from pure theoretical to pure practical lawfulness, from lawfulness in terms 
of nature to the final purpose set by the concept of freedom. (1987a 5:196) 
The two domains are no longer separated by a gulf thanks to reflective judgment. Kant 
concludes, reflective judgment ‘mediat[es] the connection of the domain of the 
concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom’ (1987a 5:197). Reflection is 
thus key to understanding Kantian ontology. And in the next section I demonstrate 
that the analogic nature of reflection necessitates the analogic nature of Kantian 
ontology. 
 
5.3 The Unity of the Critique of Judgment 
The centrality of analogy to the Critique of Judgment has been most persuasively 
argued by Angelica Nuzzo. In her words, ‘analogy is somehow constitutive of 
reflective judgments own principle and procedure.’ (2005 177) Nuzzo obtains this 
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conclusion by arguing for an overarching unity to the contents of the third Critique. 
This is a controversial position: the standard view in the Anglo-American literature is 
that the third Critique consists of a plurality of very different solutions to the problem 
of theoretically ascending from the sensible to the supersensible. Its argument is 
therefore aggregative. For example, Paul Guyer argues that, within the aesthetic 
portion of the work alone, Kant proposes six distinct ways to complete critical 
philosophy (2006 426). Guyer writes, ‘Each of the strands in the cables of a bridge 
helps to hold it up even if no one of them is unconditionally necessary for the bridge 
to stand.’ (2006 439) Symbolism, for instance, is one of these partial ‘strands’ (2006 
430). Beauty as a symbol of the good partially points to the connection between 
nature and freedom, but only when combined with other aspects of Kant’s aesthetic 
and teleological theories can it do so fully. 
However, following Nuzzo, I contend that all these seemingly disparate 
‘bridges’ from the supersensible to the sensible are essentially one. They share the 
same fundamental structure. All of them proceed by the logic of reflection and this 
means that all proceed analogically. Analogy is the key to the relation between the 
sensible and the supersensible, and so the symbol of §59 is paradigmatic in the way it 
mediates analogically between the two domains (Nuzzo 2005 326, Guérin 1974 533). 
Nuzzo’s argument turns on the nature of the work reflective judgment 
performs. As we have seen, reflective judgment invents new concepts by evaluating 
an intuition’s susceptibility to systematisation. Yet, there is an additional 
characteristic of these judgments we have yet to consider: 
Since the laws that pure understanding gives a priori concern only the 
possibility of a nature as such (as object of sense), there are such diverse 
forms of nature, so many modifications… which are left undetermined by 
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these laws, that surely there must be laws for these forms too. (1987a 5:179-
80) 
Kant contrasts the scope of his conclusions in the Critique of Pure Reason, where 
determinative judgment was at stake, with his current concerns. While previously he 
had only concerned himself with ‘the possibility of nature as such’, there is now the 
problem of ‘diverse forms of nature’ which his theory of reflective judgment must 
answer. In Nuzzo’s terms, the realm in which the first Critique takes place is ‘a realm 
where all phenomena and objects are viewed as completely homogeneous’; the trick is 
now to conceptualise what is heterogeneous (2005 186). As Kant pointedly puts it in 
his First Introduction, the task of the third Critique is to discover ‘a system that 
connects the empirical laws under a principle even in terms of that in which they 
differ’ (1987b 20:204). To invent new concepts is to discern resemblances in what is 
heterogeneous. 
Reflective judgment is therefore analogy – the search (to recall the words of 
the Prolegomena) for ‘a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar 
things’ (2001 4:358). Analogy is precisely that activity which is intent on discovering 
likenesses in objects while preserving their diversity. Symbolism, for example, 
ensures Ideas and intuitions remain incommensurable, even while exhibiting Ideas in 
intuitions. Hence, analogy is behind Kant’s claim to have realised a system that 
connects empirical laws even as they differ. 
Therefore, Nuzzo concludes, analogy is in fact ‘the internal logic – or the way 
of thinking – proper to the reflective faculty of judgment.’ (2005 318) She continues,  
Analogy designates the heuristic procedure followed by reflection… The 
theme of analogy unifies the activity of the faculty of judgment in realms as 
different as the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime, empirical cognition, 
the cognition of life and organisms. (2005 319) 
 32 
As Guérin also puts it, ‘Analogy is the type or model for all regulative principles’. 
(1974 539) Pace Guyer, Nuzzo insists that ‘Kant recognises that analogy is the way in 
which the faculty of judgment is at work in the most different spheres.’ (323) There is 
only one bridge in the Critique of Judgment, and this is analogy.
12
 
Nuzzo goes on to apply this conclusion to the sensible/supersensible relation 
(2005 255). Reflective judgment is a way of connecting the two heterogeneous 
domains of being without confusing them. Nature and freedom are analogously 
related (just as for Leibniz) – one cannot predicate properties of them in the same 
way, but they do indirectly communicate. Reflection through the operation of analogy 
unifies philosophy and completes the critical project. 
 
 
6. Analogy in the Critique of Judgment: Some Conclusions 
 
This analysis leads to a number of conclusions that demonstrate that Kantian analogy 
is far more innovative than Milbank gives it credit for. Like all the great theories of 
analogy before it, it is revolutionary. 
 
6.1 The Analogical Nature of Reality as Reflected 
In the last two sections, I have shown that the relation between the sensible and the 
supersensible is analogous when this relation is reflected upon. This puts paid to 
Milbank’s interpretation of the relation in terms of a ‘metaphysics of the sublime’. 
Milbank’s reading may be correct when the relation is experienced from the 
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 One important consequence of this is that the sublime (despite its superficial differences from the 
beautiful) also operates by means of analogy (as well as Nuzzo 2005, see Zammito 1992 264, 275-9). 
Here alone one might refute Milbank’s characterisation of Kant, for the sublime does not do away with 
analogy, but is a surreptitious form of it. 
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perspective of determinative judgment. However, the whole purpose of the third 
Critique is to suggest that reality as determined gives a misleading, underdetermined 
version of the sensible/supersensible relation. Only reality as reflected provides an 
accurate picture, and it exhibits this relation as analogous. This is the central insight of 
the Critique of Judgment which Milbank ignores: experience is constructed in two 
distinct modes, either determinatively or reflectively, and it is reality as reflected 
which is the best way to approach the transition between domains of being. Insofar 
then as this transition is a crucial element of what Milbank dubs ‘Kantian ontology’, 
Kantian ontology is analogic. 
 The proposals for an analogical post-critical metaphysics in the Prolegomena 
thus have a basis in reality – reality as reflected. Analogic ontology implicitly 
underwrites Kant’s theory of analogic predication. Kant proposes an analogia entis, 
just like Aquinas, but his analogia entis is very different. One way, for example, it 
differs is in its idealism. The subject constructs reality for Kant or, more specifically, 
the analogic ontology of reality as reflected is a projection of the analogous relations 
that hold between reason and sensibility. While understanding and sensibility are 
univocally related (and so the synthesis of categories and intuitions is possible 
univocally), this does not hold for the relation between Ideas and intuitions. The 
exhibition of an Idea is possible only analogically. From this starting point in faculty 
psychology, Kant shows how the subject goes on to understand the relation between 
the sensible and the supersensible along the same lines. Kant insists on such 
projection in On a Discovery whereby any new Critique of Pure Reason is to be made 
Superfluous by an Older One. Leibnizian pre-established harmony – that is, the 
Leibnizian theory of analogy – only makes sense in reference to transcendental 
psychology. Only from the starting point of a ‘harmony’ between the faculties (2002a 
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8:249) can this metaphysical doctrine be properly understood. Pre-established 
harmony is interpreted as 
a predetermination, not of the things existing in separation, but only of the 
mental powers in us, sensibility and understanding... [Leibniz] extends pre-
established harmony to [the relation] between the Kingdoms of Nature and of 
Grace, where a harmony has to be thought between the consequences of our 
concepts of nature and those of our concept of freedom, a union, therefore, of 
two totally different faculties, under wholly dissimilar principles in us, and not 
that of a pair of different things, existing in harmony outside each other. (2002a 
8:250)  
Here, under the guise of a summary of Leibnizian pre-established harmony, the 
argument of the Critique of Judgment is rehearsed. A critical metaphysics of analogy 
must be erected on the analogous relation between the faculties ‘in us’. This 
metaphysics will reaffirm the analogous relation between nature and grace first 
articulated by Leibniz. Thus it is the Critique of Judgment (and not the Critique of 
Pure Reason as Kant claims) that ‘might well be the true apology for Leibniz, even 
against those of his disciples who heap praises upon him that do him no honour.’ 
(2002a 8:250) 
 The analogous relation between sensibility and reason is projected onto the 
sensible/supersensible relation – and this generates analogic ontology. This basis in 
transcendental psychology is one reason Kantian analogy breaks with the past. 
 
6.2 Analogy without God: Kant beyond Leibniz 
It is the reflective subject that guarantees the analogy between the sensible and the 
supersensible in the Critique of Judgment. This marks one of Kant’s most decisive 
departures from the various traditions of analogical thinking. Unlike Aquinas and 
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unlike Leibniz, God does not maintain the analogy between domains of being; the 
subject does. This is very evident in the discussion of pre-established harmony in On 
a Discovery. The discipline which investigates analogous relations is now 
psychology, not theology. Similarly, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explicitly 
criticises Leibniz’ appeal to God (1929 B293). 
  Ontology does not pre-exist the subject; there are no analogous relations 
waiting there to be discovered. Analogy is constructed as the subject constructs 
experience.
13
 And while there are huge similarities between Kant’s conception of the 
analogical relation between nature and freedom and Leibniz’ claim for the pre-
established harmony of nature and grace, this is where they decisively part ways. It is 
the faculty psychology of the subject which ensures that analogy holds, not a 
supernatural principle. This is not a theory of pre-established harmony, but, in Michel 
Guérin’s felicitous phrase, ‘post-established harmony’ (1974 534).14 The analogous 
relation between the two domains of being is a product of the reflective judgment of 
the thinking subject. Kantian analogic ontology is created post factum: 
Leibnizian harmony establishes an analogy between the realm of nature and 
the realm of grace… Kantian thought preserves the harmony, but liberated 
from its theological implications. Far from analogy being expressed within a 
totality that is created as harmonious, it marks for Kant a… creation. (Guérin 
1974 546) 
  Indeed, it seems plausible to provisionally dub this the first atheistic theory of 
analogy (Guérin 1974 543) This claim can only be provisional, for its truth would 
depend on a thorough analysis of the role of the appendix to the Critique of Judgment 
and the relevance of its discussions of arguments for God (for which there is no room 
                                                 
13
 If it is this that Milbank objects to, then the problem is not one of ontological grounding, but of the 
very idea of not being a realist. 
14
 Latour has coined the same phrase in (as far as I can tell) a completely unconnected context (see, for 
example, 1988 164). 
 36 
here). However, it is still clear that Kant strips analogic ontology of its traditional, 
theological ground. 
 
 
7. Towards an Account of the Analogical Nature of Reality as Determined 
 
Analogy so far seems to pertain solely to the relation between the sensible and the 
supersensible; however, I claimed that Milbank’s definition of ‘Kantian ontology’ 
comprises not just this relation between domains of being, but also the relation 
between phenomena themselves. As I pointed out above, the role of reflective 
judgment in the third Critique is not merely to comprehend how domains of reality 
relate, but also to conceptualise the relationship between heterogeneous individual 
phenomena. They too – owing to the fundamentally analogic character of reflection – 
are analogously related. To the extent that individual phenomena are considered 
reflectively in their interrelation, therefore, Kantian ontology is still analogic. 
 However, such a picture is still incomplete, for there remains reality as 
determined. Milbank’s appeal to a Kantian metaphysics of the sublime assumes, I 
have suggested, the priority of reality as determined; his claim is that determined 
phenomena are univocally related to each other. There remains the possibility that 
determinative judgment operates without analogy. While there is no room in this 
essay to provide a full refutation of this claim, I do still want to suggest in conclusion 
that even when it comes to reality as determined, analogy plays a crucial part. Kant 
indicates this in his aptly named, Analogies of Experience.
15
 
                                                 
15
 Whether the Analogies are ‘aptly named’ is a moot point in the critical literature. Bennett, most 
polemically, speaks of the various labels for principles of the understanding as ‘arbitrary, 
undescriptive, proper names’ (1966 165). And, indeed, much ink has been spilt on how the analogies of 
experience operate analogically (for example, Guyer 1998 67-70, Callanan 2008). My brief concluding 
 37 
 
While the earlier sections of the Transcendental Analytic are concerned with 
locating the conditions for the possibility of objects in general, the Analytic of 
Principles switches subject matter to deal with the conditions of possibility of 
particular, existent objects and ‘the co-existence of these objects in a world.’ (Guérin 
1974 536) That is, it locates those conditions which pertain to knowing the actual 
entities that constitute a world. The Analytic of Principles treats the worldliness of 
experience, and as we shall see, the third analogy of experience is particularly 
important in this regard. 
The analogies of experience identify the way in which the categories of 
relation (permanence, succession and co-existence) determine appearances. Any 
claim to the concept of analogy here hinges on the mathematical/dynamic distinction: 
The principles of mathematical employment will be unconditionally 
necessary, that is, apodeictic. Those of dynamical employment will also 
indeed possess the character of a priori necessity, but only under the 
condition of empirical thought in some experience, therefore only mediately 
and indirectly. (1929 A160/B199-200)  
As dynamic principles, the three analogies possess ‘merely discursive certainty’ (1929 
A161/B201). They are applied to experience in an indirect manner. 
 The reason why the analogies lack the intuitive certainty of mathematical 
principles stems from their concern for the existence of objects: 
These principles have the peculiarity that they are not concerned with 
appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but only with the 
existence of such appearances and their relation to one another in respect of 
their existence… Since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can 
                                                                                                                                            
comments on the role of analogy in the Analogies of Experience are by no means intended to replace 
such commentary (especially Callanan's rigorous and fruitful reading). 
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apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative 
principles. (1929 A178/B220) 
Dynamic principles cannot be applied directly, because the fact that an object exists 
cannot be constructed in advance. In other words, dynamic principles, unlike their 
mathematical correlates, have to take account of the contingencies of actuality – of 
what is ‘only accidental’ (1929 A160/B200). Guérin makes much of this: dynamic 
principles, he argues, cannot apply logical categories immediately to experience, but 
must mediate logic through the vicissitudes of existence. The result – an ana-logic – 
is Kant’s method for coping with a world of actuality not pure concepts. The 
analogies of experience ensure the ‘coherence of the contingent… a genuine post-
established harmony.’ (Guérin 1974 534) 
 Kant explains how analogy achieves this as follows: temporal relations 
between appearances must symbolise the temporal determinations of the categories of 
relation (which are themselves unperceivable) (1929 B218-9). By judging these 
representatives or symbols according to the categories of relation, every relation 
between existent objects – and reality as determined as a whole – is judged in this 
way. It is therefore through symbolism that this process occurs. The analogies of 
experience operate on exactly the same model as the symbol. The subject judges 
relations holding between existential objects as if they resembled categorical 
relations. This is the reason (or at least one of the reasons
16
) the Analogies of 
Experience are named analogies. 
 According to Guérin, moreover, the third analogy demonstrates even more 
clearly Kant’s commitment to the analogic nature of reality as determined. He 
describes the third analogy as ‘the privileged model of analogy in general.’ (1974 
543) The third analogy is, for Kant, an attempt to prove ‘the principle of community’ 
                                                 
16
 See footnote 15 above. 
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(1929 A211) – that is, to demonstrate that the co-existence of entities can only be 
guaranteed by taking mutual interaction or influence as a symbol of this category in 
appearance.  
 The key to the third analogy is therefore the idea of influence. Influence is a 
type of causality very different to the conventional efficient causality usually 
associated with Kant’s work (Watkins 2004). It is a reciprocal causality (reminiscent 
of organism in the Critique of Judgment) where each entity is both cause and effect. 
Guérin insists, furthermore, that it operates analogically. It is, he claims, ‘a symbolic 
causality’ (1974 542). Cause and effect remain indirectly, yet harmoniously 
connected. In Kant’s words, ‘Through this commercium the appearances, so far as 
they stand outside one another and yet in connection, constitute a composite.’ (1929 
A215/B262) Entities remains distinct, but still influence each other. Kant gives the 
(rather neoplatonic) example of light: ‘The light, which plays between our eye and the 
celestial bodies, produces a mediate community between us and them, and thereby 
shows us that they coexist.’ (1929 A213/B260) Light is a third term which ensures the 
harmonious heterogeneity of mind and world (Guérin 1974 541).
17
 The third analogy, 
according to Guérin’s argument, instantiates an analogous relation between 
phenomena, a post-established harmony. Reality as determined is also analogic, just 
like reality as reflected. Analogy defines the relation between determinate 
phenomena, as well as the relation between reflected phenomena and the 
sensible/supersensible relation. 
 
                                                 
17
 Central to such a claim is Kant’s distinction between a connected and a composite community (1929 
B201-2). The parts of a composite community are not connected together in a necessary way; their 
aggregation is a more contingent, mediated affair. This is precisely the type of community the third 
analogy is intended to establish – ‘mediated commerce’ (Guérin 1974 542). 
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 Here then is the final refutation of Milbank’s challenge. It is not just that the 
‘ontological’ relation of the sensible and supersensible domains is made analogous 
through the subject’s reflective judgment; analogy structures reality as determined as 
well (and the third analogy of experience makes this particularly clear). For Kant, 
analogy is not just ‘the essence of thought’ (Guérin 1974 544), it is the essence of 
reality as well. 
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